A New Era in East Asian Security?

On Friday, unbeknownst to the rest of the world, Japan got a new Prime Minister. Shinzo Abe, a man I know almost nothing about, took over for Junichiro Koizumi, one of the most important reformers in recent Japanese history.

Two things are clear: Koizumi, while a great leader on domestic issues, didn't have the best foreign policies in the world. And Abe, who appears much like the standard bureaucrat type in comparison, will have a good chance to clean up Japan's international image. As far as I can tell, however, this could be a longshot.

You may be wondering: what's wrong with Japan's international image? Simple answer: a lot. Here in the West, we generally look to Japan as another modernized state with a powerful economy, a vanguard technologies sector, and a burgeoning alternative-energy plan. More specifically, Japan is the United States' best and most important ally in the entire Asian region, India, Russia, South Korea and Kazakhstan included. Japan contributed troops to the Iraq conflict and continues to promote U.S. interests through multilateral corridors such as the Six-Party Talks and ASEAN, and through bilateral relationships with its neighbours.

For Japan, the reasoning behind these foreign policy positions are simple: the country is threatened by North Korea, threatened by a rising China, and threatened by any anti-U.S. "balancing" blocs that may develop out of the Shanghai Cooperation (China, Russia, and some Central Asian countries) or a similar "alternative" alliance to Western hegemony.

From the U.S.'s perspective, likewise, Japan is a vital ally in a region with a few bad, unsteady, or worsening relationships (those with China, Thailand, South Korea), a number of flashpoints (Taiwan, North Korea), and an enormous amount of strategic and economic potential. The China-Japan-U.S. trading relationship, in terms of numbers, is one of the largest trading triangles in the world, for example; with very few exceptions, South Korea, China, and Taiwan have posted major GDP increases for the last two decades plus; and Japan is now coming out of its 13-year recession, poised to (at least for the time being) regain some of its international importance as the world's second or third largest economy (after the U.S. and, if you count it as such, the EU).

The bad news is that to countries like North Korea, Vietnam, South Korea and China, Japan's pro-U.S. stance makes it a "hegemonic puppet" in a region the U.S. has no real "right" to be in, period. And unlike Taiwan, Japan has a history of being a hegemonic power in the region, invading almost all of East Asia in both World Wars. Protectionist trading policies, recalcitrant militarism, and a history of invading and subjugating other nations in the region all make Japan the most hated nation in the East Asian region.

Abe should be wise to fixing this, and it looks like he already has a gameplan. Unfortunately, his gameplan reveals a major crux in Japanese domestic opinion: while Japan would like to have better relations with its neighbours, Japanese politicians continue to use nationalism to consolidate domestic support. And lately this 'nationalism' has come in the form of: government-authorized (but unpopular) textbooks that skim over or deemphasize Japan's World War II history; high-profile visits to a Shinto shrine that honours Japan's war dead (including war criminals); and most importantly, proposals to amend Japan's constitution so that it would allow the Japanese military take a more active role abroad.

(This is not to mention Japan's eager participation in the U.S.'s BMD project, a system that would at best prevent North Korea from mounting a reasonable nuclear deterrence and at worst create a new arms race among Asia's nuclear powers.)

Abe's leadership goals show no signs of a Japanese paradigm shift. The PM has not said whether he will discontinue visits to Yasukuni shine, and he has made it clear that constitutional reform is on his agenda. BMD is a no-brainer. The big problem with these developments is not that Japan has no right to a larger military mandate or ballistic missile defence. Nor is it particularly important to consider whether Chinese and South Korean officials are legitimately offended by Koizumi's Yasukuni visits.

What is more important, in all cases, is that Japan's seeming militarism is used by other East Asian nations to legitimize their own strategic objectives. This is particularly acute in democratic nations such as South Korea (and Japan, of course), where anti-Sino or anti-Japanese "rhetoric" can win legislative seats and be used to promote militaristic agendas. China is able to legitimize its military policies toward the Korean peninsula and Taiwan by pointing out the fact that Japanese militarism has increased. China has no real domestic need to legitimize its military policies, but within the CCP and politburo, legitimacy is everything. A more peaceable Japan would likely do a lot to disenfranchise the militaristic voices of China's top leadership.

Likewise, in South Korea, more aggressive Japanese and American military stances in regards to Iraq, Afghanistan and North Korea have resulted in widening anti-Japanese and anti-American sentiment. The last two South Korean elections have empowered left-wing governments who are eager to continue rapprochement with North Korea and much less eager to tow the U.S. line on North Korea's missile programs, human rights abuses, financial activities, or nuclear posturing.

What should Abe do? Cutting out the Yasukuni visits and making some formal progress on acknowledging Japan's history might be a big step. If China's long-term strategic goals entail dominating the East Asian region, retaking Taiwan, and ending U.S. involvement in the Western half of the Pacific, the shrine visits are irrelevant (as is anything else Japan can do).

Even if this is true, though, China's long-term strategic goals are not set in stone. A more conciliatory approach from the Japanese side could have an effect on the ongoing "expansion" debates that take place within the Chinese leadership. It could further entice China to take a harder line on North Korea in the Six-Party Talks, and ease tensions over Taiwan as soft-liners and moderates gain more say in Beijing's politburo standing committee. A Japanese-Sino reconcilliation could also help resolve a number of outstanding regional disputes over oil patches, sea access, and island clusters that exist between North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia, and pave the way for broader, stronger East Asian multilateral cooperation. We should never forget that North Korea and Taiwan represent two flashpoints in which millions of civilians could very easily die; while "rhetorical" events such as protests over textbooks, shrine visits, and the cancellations of high-level talks between East Asian nations may not significantly inform the underlying strategies of China, Japan, the Koreas or Russia, they certainly do nothing to acknowledge East Asia's potential for increased cooperation, mutual understanding, and formal mediums for dispute resolution.

The next big step in East Asia's future will be the establishment of a multilateral institution that aims to stabilize the region's ongoing security dilemmas. Such an institution will have to go beyond ASEAN, and it will have be inclusive of issues such as North Korea's nuclear programme, BMD, and the legitimacy of China's supposed "peaceful rise." In a region where appearances simultaneously mean everything and nothing, clearing the air on a high-level basis could help avoid a sudden disaster and better reconcile the region's progressive economic relationships with its political ones. And, hopefully, Mr. Abe knows this.

再见.