Sneak Peek #1

Here's the first sneak peek of my oh-so-exciting thesis for you guys. Basically I'm posting this up here because I don't have enough time for a regular post. Hah!

The second model, a preference analysis model, assesses the preference sets of each player, paying close attention to regional preferences, negotiation preferences, preference order, and strategies.

Within this model, the following terms have the following meanings:

∑ A player is one of the six countries formally involved in the Korean nuclear negotiations. They seek a resolution (agreement) to the dispute (North Korea’s possession of nuclear arms). The term external player indicates a player that is not North Korea.

∑ An interest is the root of what brings a player to the negotiation table, and what makes it desire a solution to the dispute. Interests are compound. For example, it is in the interest of all the external players to survive as nation-states; thus, they seek to maintain their national security. By extension, it is in their interest to limit other states’ possession of nuclear arms in their region if that possession threatens their national security, be it indirectly or directly. Thus, if the preceding statements apply, it is in their interest to seek the disarmament of North Korea.

∑ A preference is a real or imagined choice between alternatives made by a player that is put in the context of the negotiations. In other words, the preference is the interest operationalized toward a solution. It has two subcategories:

o A negotiation preference is a preference specific to the negotiations. In the case of North Korea, a common negotiation preference among the external players is the short-term freezing of North Korea’s nuclear facilities.

o A regional preference is a preference that a player does not bring to the table per se, but which affects its negotiation preferences. It is inclusive of a player’s geopolitical foreign policy and it greater national interest.

∑ A preference set is the combined preferences of a player, and denotes a specific order. For example, within one player’s preference set¸ the complete disarmament of North Korea may come before or after the freezing of North Korea’s plutonium facilities. The player prefers the first preference because it better serves its interests. The preference set provides the frame for a player’s negotiating strategy.

∑ A negotiation strategy is the precise way in which a player offers positive incentives and negative incentives so that its preferences are best served. This is inclusive of what trade-offs a player is willing to make so that it can come to a compromise on which of its preferences are met and what preferences are not met.

o A positive incentive is a means through which a player seeks to make an opposing player accept a solution that best serves its preferences by making an offer that it infers will satisfy one of the opposing players’ preferences. An example is the removal of sanctions on North Korea (incentive), in exchange for complete disarmament (preference).

o A negative incentive is similar to a positive incentive, but it instead threatens the opposing player’s preferences instead of serving them in the event that the opposing player resists making a trade-off. An example is the threat of invasion (incentive), in the absence of a nuclear freeze (preference).

o A trade-off is a compromise through which the preferences of two or more parties are met by mutual agreement. These are usually part of a solution. An example of a trade-off in the Korean case would be North Korea agreeing to freeze its Yongbyon reactor for a period of time in exchange for a limited aid package.

∑ A solution is an agreement between players to resolve the issue on terms that satisfy all the players’ preferences. An example of a solution in the Korean case is GAF.