Oh, Kim, How You Kill Me (and other human beings)

A few thoughts on the latest North Korean affair:

• A North Korean nuclear test isn't a big deal in itself. We've known that the Kim Family Regime (KFR) has probably had nuclear arms for some time now -- maybe even as early as 1993 -- and all international attempts to disarm North Korea have worked off of the assumption that KFR has built somewhere between a half-dozen and a dozen or so primitive warheads. The October 9 test simply confirms our working assumptions. They've got em.
  
  
• The big danger here is what this means for the region. Japan and China now have more compelling excuses to go ahead and eat their parts of the East Asian re-militarization cake. Japan, because it is a liberal democracy and its pro-military MPs gain ground anytime Kim Jong-Il pulls something threatening, has no defence mechanisms against a nuclear-equipped North Korea. In fact, Japan has few defence mechanisms against an emboldened North Korea whatsoever, aside from the hollow comfort of knowing that if and when a North Korean MRBM lands on Tokyo, North Korea will be flattened by American and South Korean bombs (although, my guess is far more of the former and few of the latter).
  
  China has a remilitarization case, of course, because it is the rightful Asia-Pacific hegemon, or something like that, and balancing against imperialist American presence in the region is a must. Well, a must only insofar as Chinese militarization does not jeopardize the greater Sino-U.S. relationship or destabilize the region. China is happy with the status quo: Japan, though no longer in a recession, is in wane as the predominant Asian economic power. China has pursued major remilitarization for almost two decades without serious contention from its neighbours, and its economic renaissance still goes undaunted by protest over yuan undervaluation, trade defecits, and intellectual property issues. A remilitarized Japan is a real threat to China's regional ambitions, particularly if that remilitarization goes hand in hand with harder lines on China-Japan regional disputes (it's the oil, stupid!). Thus we have a real Asian domino effect: North Korea tests, Japan builds up its arsenal, China does the same, and the U.S. responds by further encouraging South Korea and Japan to build. North Korea announces that it feels increasingly threatened, and uses the remilitarization outside of its borders as an excuse to conduct further nuclear tests. This is not to mention Taiwan -- the real Asian flashpoint -- which could jump into the gun game at any point.
  
  What would all this remilitarization mean? Hopefully, nothing -- but one thing is certain: at some point, Kim Jong-Il will die, or his regime will collapse, or both. And who knows if his predecessor will have a firm grip on things. If North Korea collapses as functioning state, which it would without continuing Chinese support, any number of scenarios could happen. Missiles could get launched, nuclear arms could be used or sold, and armies could march across the 38th parallel. Refugees would certainly pour across the DPRK-PRC border in the hundreds of thousands -- if not millions -- once the North Korean state apparatus stops feeding its citizens the few scraps it now manages. And as for all that military ordinance -- who knows? North Korea has hundreds of MRBMs, a few nuclear arms, lots of WMDs, and thousands of other odds and sods that any terrorist group with half a sense of mind would certainly want to get its hands on. In other words, a North Korean collapse would be a disaster.
  
  China-DPRK relations are in an obvious thaw. In a surprising move, China supported the UNSC sanctions stemming from North Korea's July 4, 2006 missile tests. Just the other day, PRC officials teamed up with the Japanese to condemn a possible North Korean nuclear test. China will likely support future sanctions being put to the UNSC by the U.S. following yesterday's nuclear test. And, as far as the Six-Party Talks are concerned, simmering DPRK-PRC relations could mean that China will be more receptive to the U.S. strategy of using sticks as an inducement for North Korean cooperation, rather than carrots.
  
  
• A second, related danger is what the test means for the nonproliferation regime. The success of both bilateral and multilateral negotiations in the Korean case is stunning: aside from talking North Korea into limiting its nuclear programme between 1994 and 2002, every element of the nonproliferation regime has thus far failed to achieve a peaceful solution to the Korean nuclear dilemma. North Korea has since 2003 been developing its nuclear arsenal while the rest of the world, afraid of claiming ignorance or simply bombing the country, has attempted to talk the DPRK into doing otherwise. And it has done this with good cause: ignoring North Korea is simply not an option, particularly given the regime's track record of selling WMD technology to anyone who will buy. Bombing North Korea, conversely, would be extremely military risky, and would almost certaintly result in the deaths of thousands if not millions of Korean citizens. Because of a lack of alternatives, and because diplomacy did succeed in 1994, the Six-Party Talks are still option number 1 for the international community. But will they get anywhere? And what can we expect if they do?
  
  My hunch is that North Korea has no reason to give up its nuclear arms, and will not do so so long as KFR remains in charge. Worse, the regime does not respond well to threats -- it either does not believe it will ever be invaded, or thinks it can win a confrontation with the U.S. It therefore will not give up its nuclear arsenal under threat of sanction. Rewarding North Korea with positive incentives for good behaviour has its uses -- we can limit its nuclear programme and resolve the short-term crisis -- but KFR is unlikely to order a full dismantlement given that the regime is hated around the world, under sanctions for a number of non-nuclear related activities, and consistently targeted by post-Cold War foreign policies, nuclear arms or not. A robust nuclear capability, then, is the only real international card of value the North Koreans possess.

Can we live with a nuclear North Korea? Probably, but it could be dangerous, particularly given the regime's dwindling ability to economically sustain itself. Money counterfieting, drug smuggling, kidnapping, and missile trafficking are among the regime's favourite means of procuring funds. And we can probably add WMD/nuclear warhead exporting to that list if we give it a few more years, particularly if China decides to pull the plug. To prevent North Korea from threatening the world with its arsenal (and possibly selling weapons to groups who will use them without fear of retaliation), the international community would have to give North Korea no good reason to possess nuclear arms in the first place. Unless international norms suddenly reverse so that isolated, human rights-violating, totalitarian regimes are given their proper place amidst the celebrated nations of the international system, this sort of in medias res carte blanche of international acceptability is unlikely.

So we are left with nonperforming negotiations, nonperforming nonproliferation, nonperforming threats, and a very well-performing North Korean nuclear programme.

What's to be done? A carrots and sticks negotiations approach may get us another agreement that will limit North Korea's programme, ease tensions, and build trust among the East Asian nations. But North Korea will probably cheat on that agreement. Given this, a noncompliant North Korea will simply have to become an acceptable reality -- that short-term limitations will have to suffice, and that the region's players will have to look outside of the nonproliferation regime to find a real solution to the nuclear impasse. Regime change is obviously a major factor in framing the Korean secuirty dilemma, but regime change can take many, many forms. Easing the pressure on North Korea in the short term may make a soft-landing -- a longer, more drawn out process of reintegration and opening up -- a much better alternative to an immediate hard landing, and it'll be one that won't get lots of people killed. For all we know, Kimg Jong-Il really is nuts, really does want to retake South Korea, and really will push every button he can as soon as he feels he is ready. And that's a risk we shouldn't be willing to take.

再见。